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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Did the District Court err in granting Summary Judgment

in favor of Hood Corporation (hereinafter "Hood") on the issue of
alter ego?
2.

Is it reversible error for the district court to elect

to not reconsider a matter which has been previously argued and
resolved on its merits?
3*

Did the District Court err in stating that the Salt

Lake City Corporation

(hereinafter "SLCC"), as a governmental

entity with vast resources, should be held to a higher standard
of performance in pursuing a legal action against a private
entity, and further, that they be bound by the performance of the
counsel they have retained?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about May 15, 1984, James Constructors, Inc., a Nevada
corporation, filed a suit against SLCC, Civil No. C-84-2857, in
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.

The substance of such suit was with regard to a contract

between the two entities to construct a water pipeline known as
the Big Cottonwood Conduit Extension Terminal Park Transmission
Pipeline.
On or about the 28th of June, 1984, SLCC filed a separate
action against James Constructors, Inc., a Nevada corporation,
Hood Corporation, a California corporation, and Industrial
Indemnity Company, a California corporation.

1

Such action was

filed as Civil No. C-84-3972 in the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah*
On the 13th day of August, 1984, pursuant to motion, the
District Court ordered the above referenced actions consolidated
and directed various parties to answer and file responsive
pleadings (R. 63-64).

On the 5th of September, 1984, Hood, by

and through its attorney of record, David A. Reeve, filed its
answer

to SLCC ' s Complaint.

SLCC was represented by its

attorney, Arthur Kessler.
SLCC took the depositions of the chief representatives of
each of the named defendants, to wit:

James Foreman, President

of James Constructors, Inc., on December 11, 1984; Marc Laulhere,
President of Hood Corporation, on December 18, 1984; and Ken
Evans, Chief Officer of Industrial Indemnity Company on December
18, 1984.

Further, SLCC responded to two sets of Interrogatories

propounded by the defendants.
On or about July 5, 1985, SLCC amended its Complaint to
clarify its cause of action and to restate its position against
various defendants (R. 131-134).
On the 2nd day of August, 1985, the defendant Hood's Motion
for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing before the
Honorable Judith M. Billings, District Judge

(R. 161).

In

support of said Motion, Hood's counsel filed a Memorandum of
Points and Authorities setting forth various bases upon which
their Motion should be granted (R. 113-124).

In addition to such

Memorandum, an Affidavit of Marc Laulhere, President of Hood
2

Corporation, was filed in support of their Motion for Summary
Judgment (R. 145-147).
SLCC f s counsel, Arthur Kessler, in response to Hood's
Motion

for Summary Judgment, filed no reply memoranda or

affidavits of any party having any material knowledge, but
instead, filed one document entitled "Reply Affidavit", written
in the form of an affidavit, under oath, by Attorney Kessler,
which set forth the theory of SLCC in its claims against Hood (R.
153-160).
Attorney Kessler, representing SLCC, continued in his Reply
Affidavit to discuss point by point criteria of the alter ego
theory for holding one party liable for the acts of another.

He

further cited from the deposition taken from the president of
Hood, Marc Laulhere, and in support of SLCC's position.

No

dispositions were on file with, presented to, or published by the
District Court.
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, through the Honorable Judith M. Billings, after hearing
arguments of counsel and reviewing and considering such materials
as filed by the respective parties, granted the Summary Judgment
in favor of Hood (R. 161). Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and the Summary Judgment documents were prepared by Hood's
counsel and approved as to form by counsel for SLCC (R. 162-166).
The Summary Judgment was entered by the District Court on
the 21st day of August, 1985 (R. 162-166).

On June 16, 1986,

notice of appearance of new counsel was filed by Wilford A.
3

Beesley on behalf of SLCC (R. 199-200).

On December 9, 1986,

SLCC filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Leave to Amend
Complaint, which was set for hearing on the 22nd day of December,
1986 (R. 223-224).
At such hearing, on December 22, 1986, before the Honorable
Judith M. Billings, the District Court had agreed to consider two
issues only with regard to SLCC's Motion.

First, the court

agreed to reconsider procedurally whether or not it was going to
allow SLCC to reargue the Summary Judgment Motion which had been
granted some time prior.

Secondly, whether or not it would allow

SLCC to amend its Complaint and plead the alter ego theory of
liability against Hood.
The court ruled in favor of Hood on both issues and denied
SLCC's Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Amend its Complaint (R.
277).

From such ruling, Second Amended Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law (R. 301-305), and a Second Amended Order (R.
298-300) were entered by the court.

Further, such Order

certified for appeal purposes the Summary Judgment granted in
favor of Hood.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The only facts that were before the District Court at the
time of the Summary Judgment Motion, were those items contained
in the materials submitted to, and on file with, the District
Court at the time of the said hearing.
1.

Such materials include:

Motion of Third-Party Defendant Hood Corporation for

Summary Judgment (R. 125-127).
4
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Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of

Third-Party Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment against
Third-Party Plaintiff (R. 113-124).
3.

Affidavit of Marc Laulhere (R. 148-149).

4.

Reply Affidavit (R. 153-160).

Note:
copies of items in paragraphs 1 through 4 above are
attached in the addendum to this brief.
The only factual materials in support of SLCC's position
that were before the District Court at the time of the Summary
Judgment Motion were those contained in the Reply Affidavit of
SLCC's attorney, Arthur Kessler (R. 153-160).

No depositions

which had been taken were on file with, or presented to, the
District Court at the time of the Summary Judgment Motion.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Hood contends that error was not made by the District Court
in granting a summary judgment in its favor and against SLCC.
Further, this court on appeal can only review and consider those
items from the record that were before the lower court at the
time of the Summary Judgment Motion.

However, assuming arguendo,

if this court could consider all facts now set forth by SLCC,
Summary Judgment would still be improper, inasmuch as factual
allegations, viewed in the light most favorable to SLCC, are
insufficient to meet the requirements under the two-prong test
set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in piercing the corporate
veil.
Hood

further

contends

that the District Court is not

compelled to reconsider a matter which has been argued and
5

resolved

on its merits*

Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, provides for certification of certain classes of final
judgments for appeal purposes, and gives the court discretion of
review in certain cases*

Such rule does not mandate that the

court must allow parties to reargue dispositive matters which
have previously been decided on their merits.
Furthermore, error was not made by the District Court in
finding that SLCC, as a public entity with vast resources, should
be held to a high standard of performance when proceeding against
private entities, and that it should further be bound by the
performance of the counsel it retains.

The court did not create

different judicial standards, but simply stated by such finding
that a government entity should be required to perform at the
highest

level of competence

in proceeding against private

individuals.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING HOOD
CORPORATION'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF ALTER
EGO.
A.

The record to be reviewed on appeal only consists of

materials and exhibits presented to and filed with the District
Court at the time of such proceeding.
On August 2, 1985, after the lawsuit had been pending
against Hood for more than one year, the Hood Corporation filed
and argued its Motion for Summary Judgment, supported by a
Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and an Affidavit from the
6

President of Hood, Marc Laulhere.

In response to such Motion,

SLCC filed no official memoranda, but filed a document entitled
"Reply Affidavit" executed by its attorney of record, Arthur
Kessler.

In such Reply Affidavit, Attorney Kessler set forth his

opinions as to why he believed the alter ego theory of liability
raised factual issues and thus should prohibit the court from
granting the Summary Judgment as prayed by the Hood Corporation.
The Reply Affidavit

filed by SLCC's attorney, Arthur

Kessler, together with the pleadings on file, were the only
materials that District Judge Judith M. Billings was given to
review and consider in support of SLCC's defense to the Summary
Judgment Motion.

No affidavits were submitted setting forth

facts that would be admissible in evidence from people competent
to testify at trial.

The depositions which had been taken of

various parties prior to the Motion had not been published, were
not presented to the court, and with the exception of several
references made to the deposition of Marc Laulhere, as set forth
in Attorney Kessler's Affidavit, no materials were submitted from
any other depositions, nor were they presented to the court in
any manner.
In Reliable Furniture Company v. Fidelity and Guaranty
Insurance Underwriters Inc., 380 P.2d 135 (Utah 1963), the Utah
Supreme Court set forth a general principle of appellant review
when it stated as follows:
"Four depositions were urged for examination by
this court. Somehow two are here, two not, none of
which was published or presented to the trial court.
The two in our court still are sealed. Under simple
7

principles of appellate review, we cannot consider
matters not in the record before the trial court,
absence of which was made apparent on examination of
the record filed with this court/'
In Thompson v. Ford Motor Company, 384 P.2d 109 (Utah 1963),
the Utah Supreme Court made a similar finding with regard to the
use of depositions on appeal which were not considered by the
trial court.

The court stated as follows:

"These depositions reach us in sealed envelopes—
the notary public's seal still intact. Thus, it is
apparent that they were never marked and introduced
into evidence nor read by the trial judge.
"Both parties quote extensively from these
depositions in their briefs. Probably they each had
copies, and probably these were used at hearing upon
the Motion for Summary Judgment. However, this we
cannot assume.
In fact, we must assume that the
testimony contained in the depositions was not
resented to or considered by the lower court."
Emphasis added.)

?

It is a well established rule in Utah that matters which are
not part of the trial court record will not be considered by the
appellate court on appeal.

Rosander v. Larsen, 376 P.2d 146

(Utah 1962), Uckerman v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Company,
588 P. 2d 142 (Utah 1978), Geis v. Continental Oil Company, 511
P.2d 725 (Utah 1973), First Security Bank of Utah v. Utah Turkey
Growers, Inc., 610 P.2d 329 (Utah 1980), Villeneuve v. Schamanek,
639 P.2d 214 (Utah 1981), Baldwin & Associates v. Smith, 646 P.2d
711 (Utah 1982), Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. v. Chapman,
699 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985), Daggett v. Tiffany, 467 P.2d 629 (Wash.
app 1970).

8

B.

No genuine issues as to any material facts exist with

regard to the alter ego theory of liability that would prevent
the entry of summary judgments
It is not disputed by Hood herein that a Summary Judgment
cannot be granted where a genuine issue as to any material facts
exist.

Further, on appeal, the appellate court must view the

evidence in a light most favorable to the losing party.

However,

Hood strongly disagrees with the assertion by SLCC that the
question of alter ego itself is an issue of fact that cannot be
properly disposed of through Summary Judgment.

SLCC cites the

case of Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates, 635 P.2d 53
(Utah 1981), in support of this broad proclamation.

In Amjacs,

the Utah Supreme Court found that the record revealed disputed
issues of material fact, making a Summary Judgment in that case
inappropriate inasmuch as a written agreement referred to both
the corporate party

and the individual

in its individual

capacity, thus creating an ambiguity with regard to the written
document.

Further, inasmuch as the District Court had not

considered the plaintiff's alter ego claims in its Order of
Dismissal, and under the facts of such case, the Utah Supreme
Court stated that issues of fact were raised.
The facts of Amjacs, supra, were not on point with the
instant case, and it is asserted herein that such case does not
stand for the proposition as set forth by SLCC, in that the very
nature of an alter ego theory of liability precludes summary
judgment without a trial on the facts.
9

To be successful

in asserting an alter ego theory of

liability, and thus pierce through the corporate veil, the Utah
Supreme Court has adopted a two-prong test, as set forth in
Norman v. Murray First Thrift and Loan, 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah
1979).

In Norman, the two-prong test was stated as follows?

(1)
"There must be such unity of interest and
ownership that the separate personalities of the
corporation and the individual no longer exist, vis.,
the corporation is, in fact, the alter ego of one or a
few individuals; and
(2) "The observance of the corporate form would
sanction a fraud, promoting justice, where an equitable
result would follow*"
The Utah Supreme Court, in Messick v* PHD Trucking Service,
Inc* , 678 P.2d 791 (Utah 1984), in reversing the trial court's
judgment, piercing

the corporate veil, set forth that no

justification existed for piercing the veil between the defendant
corporation and its officers, reaffirmed the two-prong test set
forth in Norman, supra, and went on to state:
"The first prong of the test is often termed the
'formalities requirement1, referring to the corporate
formalities required by statute* It is established on
a showing of the corporation's failure to observe such
statutory formalities. The second prong is addressed
to the conscience of the Court, and the circumstances
under which it will be met vary with each case*
"The record before us is devoid of proof to
justify the trial court"s ruling that the corporate
entity should be disregarded* No evidence was adduced
to establish the corporation's neglect of statutory
formalities nor was any evidence received to the affect
that any observance of the corporate entity would
'sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or produce an
equitable result'."
If this Court reviews each and every fact as submitted to
the District Court at the time of Hood's Motion for Summary
10

Judgment, and views such facts in a light most favorable to SLCC,
such facts under that preview do not raise any genuine issue of a
material fact that would preclude the entry of Summary Judgment
on the alter ego theory of liability.

Not one factual issue was

asserted or alleged as to whether or not corporate formalities
were kept by

the Hood

Corporation

subsidiary, James Constructors, Inc.

and

its wholly

owned

To the contrary, both were

alleged to be valid corporations, incorporated in California and
Nevada respectively, and no allegations or assertions were to the
contrary with regard

to the failure to observe corporate

formalities.
In addition, with regard to the second prong of the Utah
Supreme Court's

test, namely, that the observance of the

corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an
inequitable result would follow, such is also contrary to any
interpretation of the facts before the court.

The record shows

that SLCC contracted with James Constructors, Inc. and required
that they be fully bonded, which they were by the Industrial
Indemnity Insurance Company.

No allegations have been made or

factual assertions set forth, which, taken in any light, would
sanction a fraud, promote injustice or cause an inequitable
result, thereby meeting the second prong of the two-prong test
used by the Utah Supreme Court in piercing the corporate veil.
C«

Hood Corporation, as a matter of law, was entitled to a

summary judgment on the alter ego theory of liability against
Salt Lake City Corporation.
11

The facts as considered by the District Court, viewed in the
light most favorable to SLCC, could not support a finding, as a
matter of law, that the corporate veil of the Hood Corporation be
pierced.

As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Institutional

Laundry, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 706 P.2d 1066 (Utah
1985):
M

A corporation, be it parent or subsidiary, has
its own legal identity and existence. Common ownership
or control does not automatically destroy that separate
entity. Although in appropriate cases equity may look
through the corporate shell to its alter ego to prevent
fraud or wrong doing, the general rule still applies
that corporations are separate legal entities bound by
the obligations as well as the benefits."
The District Court, in granting a Summary Judgment in favor
of the respondent Hood, had no alternative based upon the
evidence presented to it, as a matter of law.

Assuming all facts

presented to the District Court were true, and viewing them in
the light most favorable to SLCC, to disregard the corporate
entity and pierce the corporate veil under the alter ego theory
of liability, allegations and factual assertions sufficient to
meet the two-prong test of the Utah Supreme Court would need to
be set forth.

Factual assertions sufficient to do such do not

exist, pursuant to the record on review herein.
POINT II
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO NOT RECONSIDER THE
PRIOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED IN FAVOR OF HOOD CORPORATION.
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for the
circumstance where multiple claims or multiple parties are
present in ligitation, and where a court directs final judgment
12

as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties*
Certification of the order is necessary prior to appellate review
of such final order*

Based thereon, the Summary Judgment entered

by the court in August of 1984 was not an appealable order as of
that time, inasmuch as it did not have the certification that
Rule 54(b) requires*

However, SLCC would have the court believe

that the lower court was mandated to reconsider a prior final
order, the original Summary Judgment, and therefore rehear an
earlier matter which had been argued and decided on its merits.
The District Court has never claimed not to have the power
to reconsider such order, but elected not to review its prior
order insamuch as it had been argued and decided on its merits,
and no circumstances existed which would pursuade the court to do
otherwise*

It is submitted that such a position by the District

Court Judge was not error, and was well within the discretion the
court had under Rule 54(b)*

The District Court felt, as does

respondent herein, that an appellant review was still available
to the plaintiff, which is the subject matter of this appeal, and
that a second trial at the District Court level on the same
factual issues was not warranted, and in fact would have been
prejudicial to Hood, based on the extreme amount of time which
had lapsed between the original granting of the Summary Judgment
and the request for reconsideration under 54(b)*
To rule otherwise at this point would be to mandate any
District Court to rehear matters which have been argued and

13

decided on their merits in every case, which is clearly not the
intention of Rule 54(b) as set forth in the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure,
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION, AS A GOVERNMENT ENTITY WITH VAST RESOURCES, SHOULD
BE HELD TO A HIGHER STANDARD OF PERFORMANCE IN PURSUING A LEGAL
ACTION AGAINST A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL, AND THAT THEY ARE BOUND BY
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE COUNSEL THEY RETAIN.
The finding by the District Court that SLCC, as a government
entity with vast resources, should be held to a higher standard
of performance in pursuing a legal action against a private
individual, and that SLCC is bound by the actions and performance
of the attorney it retains, was not a dispositive matter in this
case*
Summary

Such determination had nothing to do with the original
Judgment Motion which is on review by this court.

Further, the District Court's election to not reconsider its
prior Summary Judgment was independent from the determination in
this case.

Such finding was directed at the level of legal

competence and performance which a counsel representing a public
entity

should perform

to.

Neither of the cases cited by

appellant SLCC, in opposition to this position, and in support of
that supposedly well established doctrine, is on point with this
issue as set forth by the District Court«
In State v. Taira, 78 NM 276, 430 P.2d 773, 777 (1967), the
governmental entity sought relief from the individual defendant's
discovery requests under sovereign immunity grounds, but such
governmental entity had on the other hand brought an action in
14

the courts seeking relief from the court under Rules of Civil
Procedure against this individual.

The New Mexico Supreme Court

ruled that where a governmental entity seeks relief in court
under Rules of Civil Procedure, it waives certain governmental
immunities, and under such Rules of Civil Procedure, is an
ordinary litigant.
In Bank Line v. United States, 163 F.2d 133, (2nd Cir.
1947), also cited by SLCC in support of its position, the Second
Circuit Court ruled with regard to an admiralty case, wherein the
governmental entity did not want to comply with discovery rules
and disclose materials, on the grounds that the investigation it
had conducted had been for naval purposes, and therefore such
results of the investigation were not discoverable pursuant to
the court order.

Such governmental entity sought a protective

order of the court relieving it from complying with discovery
rules.

The Second Circuit, in denying such protective order,

stated that where the governmental entity seeks to prevent the
discovery of certain materials, such prevention must be done
pursuant to the general rules and procedures which apply to an
ordinary citizen.
Neither case above cited was on point with the issue as set
forth by the District Court in its statement that SLCC should be
held to a higher level of performance.

Such ruling was not an

error under the facts and circumstances as applied in this case.
This finding by the District Court is vastly different from
holding SLCC to a greater burden of proof or different standard
15

of civil procedure.

However, notwithstanding the foregoing, such

issue with regard to the level of performance with which SLCC
should be held, was not a part of the Summary Judgment entered in
this case and was not dispositive with regard to any facts
concerning the prior Summary Judgment entered in favor of Hood.
CONCLUSIONS
In view of the foregoing, the actions taken by the District
Court, in conjunction with the granting of Summary Judgment, are
proper and supported by the facts before such court.

Further,

the two-prong test set up by the Utah Supreme Court in piercing
the corporate veil, assuming all facts alleged by SLCC are true,
could not be met.

Further, the District Court did not err in

electing to not reconsider the earlier judgment, under Rule
54(b), wherein its prior determination had been a matter argued
and resolved on its merits.

Finally, the statement that SLCC

should be held to a high level of performance based on its vast
resources, was neither dispositive nor prejudicial, and was not
in error when taken in context as set forth by the District Court
below.
Therefore, Hood Corporation respectfully requests this court
to affirm the District Court's entry of Summary Judgment granted
in its favor.
DATED this

//

day of October, 1987.
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST

&/tfA<~<
DAVID A. REEVE
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ADDENDUM
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DAVID A. REEVE #2717
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST
Attorney for Third Party
Defendant Hood Corporation
1300 Walker Center
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephones (801) 359-2093
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC.,
a Nevada corporation,

i
j

vs.

MOTION OF THIRD PARTY
::
: DEFENDANT HOOD CORPORATION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
::

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,

:

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

:

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation of
the State of Utah,

:
:
s

Third Party Plaintiff,

:

VS.

!

JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC.,
a Nevada corporation, HOOD
CORPORATION, California
corporation, and INDUSTRIAL
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a
California corporation,

:

Civil No.

C 84-2857

:

Judge Judith Billings

Third Party Defendants.
COMES NOW the third party defendant, Hood Corporation,
by and through their attorney of record, David A. Reeve, and
hereby makes motion to the Court for a Summary Judgment in

their behalf, against the third party plaintiff, Salt Lake
City Corporation.

Such motion is based upon Rule 56(b) of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended.
The third party defendant Hood Corporation's motion is
based upon the pleadings on file herein, the Answers to
Interrogatories submitted by the third party plaintiff,
Affidavit of the president of Hood Corporation, and the
Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted herewith.

All

of the foregoing establish that there are no genuine issues
of material fact as between the third party plaintiff, Salt
Lake City Corporation, and the third party defendant, Hood
Corporation, and thereby such third party defendant is
entitled to a Summary Judgment ordering the dismissal of all
claims brought by said third party plaintiff, pursuant to
their prayer in the Answer filed herein.
DATED this

day of June, 1985.

DAVID A. REEVE
Attorney for Third Party
Defendant Hood Corporation

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Motion of Third Party Defendant Hood
Corporation for Summary Judgmentf postage pre-paid, this
day of June, 1985 to the following:
Arthur L. Keesler, Jr.
Attorney for Salt Lake City Corporation
100 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Cc Reed Brown
Attorney for James Constructors, Inc.
and Industrial Indemnity Company
4685 South Highland Drive, Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
>
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DAVID A. REEVE #2717
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST
Attorney for Third Party
Defendant Hood Corporation
1300 Walker Center
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-2093
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC.,
a Nevada corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
Defendant.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation of
the State of Utah,

:
:
s!
t
::
:
:
:
:

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF THIRD PARTY
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF

:

Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.

:

JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC.,
a Nevada corporation, HOOD
CORPORATION, California
corporation, and INDUSTRIAL
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a
California corporation,

:
:
:

Civil No.

C 84-2857

:

Judge Judith Billings

Third Party Defendants. !
COMES NOW the third party defendant Hood Corporation, by
and through their attorney of record David A, Reeve, and
hereby submits the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment against

third party plaintifff Salt Lake City Corporation.
FACTS
1.

According to the Complaint of the third party plain-

tiff, Salt Lake City Corporation, on or about the 23rd day of
May, 1983, Notice to Bidders was sent to James Constructors,
Inc., for the construction of the Big Cottonwood Conduit
Extention Terminal/Park Transmission Pipeline.
2.

Further, on or about June 8, 1983, when the bids

were opened, James Constructors, Inc. was the apparent low
bidder concerning said project.

Based thereon, additional

information was requested of James Constructors, Inc. prior
to their receiving the said contract.

In response to the

request for additional information, James Constructors, Inc.
through their president, James E. Foreman, sent a letter
dated June 13, 1983, together with various enclosures as referenced by said letter, to the Salt Lake City Corporation.
The said letter and some of the enclosed materials were attached to the Complaint of third party plaintiff Salt Lake City
Corporation as exhibits.
3.

The June 13, 1983 letter, executed by James E.

Foreman, president of James Constructors, Inc., was sent to
Mr. Larry Allen, on behalf of the Salt Lake City Corporation,
referred in paragraph 4 to an enclosed financial report from
the Hood Corporation.

Further, it stated that James

Constructors, Inc. was a wholly owned subsidary of the Hood
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Corporation, as shown by the enclosed statement.

Within the

consolidated financial statement submitted, there was a complete audited statement of the Hood Corporation and all of
its subsidiaries.

The financial data concerning James Con-

structors, Inc. was specifically set forth independently, and
all of the assets, liabilities and other important data
regarding James Constructors, Inc. was listed separately as
would be the procedure under a consolidated financial statement such as the one submitted.
4.

In the deposition of James E. Foreman, president of

James Constructors, Inc., he states that the sole reason he
submitted the Hood Corporation's audited consolidated financial statement, was that Salt Lake City Corporation had
requested an audited statement from James Constructors, Inc.
and he did not have a statement which was audited independent
from the consolidated statement regarding the Hood Corporation and its subsidiaries.

Therefore, he submitted the con-

solidated statement which was audited and certified by Ernst
& Whitney, C.P.A.
5.

Salt Lake City Corporation alleges in its Complaint

that their award of the construction contract to James Constructors, Inc. was based solely on the experience and financial stability of the Hood Corporation.
6.

The Salt Lake City Corporation, in response to the

James Constructors, Inc.fs Second Set of Interrogatories,
stated as follows:
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Interrogatory No, 5:

State with specificity, all items

or areas of additional information requested concerning
James Constructors based solely upon the experience and
financial stability of the Hood Corporation.
Answer;

See attached Exhibit "A" reply letter to James

Constructors.
Interrogatory No. 6:

State all facts on which the city

relies in alleging that the city awarded the contract to
James Constructors based solely upon the experience and
financial stability of Hood Corporation.
Answer:

See Exhibit "A" which states that James Constr-

uctors is a wholly owned subsidiary of Hood Corporation
and the only financial information supplied was the
financial report for Hood Corporation.
7.

There are no other allegations by the Salt Lake City

Corporation with regard to any contact they had with the Hood
Corporation directly, or any oral or written representations
of any nature from Hood Corporation to the Salt Lake City
Corporation.

Salt Lake City Corporation thereafter awarded

the contract to James Constructors, Inc.
8.

Salt Lake City Corporation required that James

Constructors, Inc. obtain a performance bond concerning the
said project.

Such performance bond was obtained from the

Industrial Indemnity Company in the amount of $1,128,481.00.
-3-

9.

All contracts, agreements and related documents

which were prepared by the Salt Lake City Corporation concerning the awarding of this project, were prepared for the signature of James Constructors, Inc., as the sole contractor,
and the Industrial Indemnity Company as their surety.

No

reference was made in any written documents prepared by the
Salt Lake City Corporation as to the third party defendant
Hood Corporation.
10.

No allegations have been made by the Salt Lake City

Corporation as to any contact the city has had with the third
party defendant Hood Corporation, and a negative response has
been given to such request in the Answers to Interrogatories
filed pursuant therewith by Salt Lake City Corporation.
11.

Based upon all pleadings on file herein, together

with the Answers to Interrogatories submitted by the Salt
Lake City Corporation, the city's claim as to liability on
the part of the third party defendant Hood Corporation, is
based upon the fact that James Constructors, Inc. is a wholly
owned subsidiary of such party.

Further, that James Constru-

ctors, Inc. submitted a consolidated audited financial statement of the Hood Corporation and its subsidiaries to Salt
Lake City Corporation.
POINT I
STATUTE OP FRAUDS PROHIBITS THE LIABILITY OF THE HOOD
CORPORATION BASED UPON THE CLAIMS OF SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION
Pursuant to the Statute of Frauds, found in §25-5-4,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, wherein such section
in part states as follows:
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Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed.
- "In the following cases every agreement shall be void
unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party to be charged
therewith". . . (2) - "Every promise to answer for the
debt, default or miscarriage of another."
The basis for the Statute of Frauds, is to prohibit the
unjust liability of a party for the acts of another based
upon oral representations or naked assertions.

Liability for

the debts of a third party is a substantial imposition, and
should only be founded upon a substantial basis for such.
All parties are entitled to the presumptions and specific
limitations as set forth in the Statute of Frauds above
stated.
In a subsequent section within the Statute of Frauds,
§25-5-5, Utah Code Annotated, such states as follows:
"Representations as to credit of a third person. - To
charge a person upon a representation as to the credit
of a third person, such representation, or some memorandum thereof, must be in writing subscribed by the party
to be charged therewith."
Again it is clear that the statutory mandate is that
prior to a third party being charged with the debt of another, he must have assented to such obligation in writing.
Under the facts of the instant case, it is undisputable that
the Hood Corporation had no contact with Salt Lake City Corporation themselves, nor did they make any representations in
writing to said Salt Lake City Corporation.

Further, all of

the said documents were prepared by the Salt Lake City Corporation after reviewing the audited consolidated financial
statement of the Hood Corporation and their subsidary James
Constructors, Inc., and no reference was made to Hood Corporation and no attempt was made to secure their guarantee.
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POINT II
THE CONTRACT ITSELF PRECLUDES LIABILITY ON THE PART OF THE
HOOD CORPORATION
Within the written agreement between Salt Lake City Corporation and James Constructors, Inc., Article 17, entitled
Contract Documents, sets forth specifically the following:
"This agreement consists of the documents listed under
§1.6 of the general provisions attached, all of which
are made a part hereof and none of which can be altered,
except in writing signed by both parties."
Within all such documents, no reference or inference is
made to or by the Hood Corporation.

James Constructors,

Inc., is listed as the bidder, and the contractor.

The

contractor, is defined in §1.08 of the general provisions as:
"The person or persons, co-partnership or corporation
who have entered into a contract with Salt Lake City
Corporation."
Further, Industrial Indemnity Company, is listed as the
surety, and a performance bond was signed, executed and submitted to Salt Lake City Corporation in conjunction with the
award of said contract.
Inasmuch as all of the said contract documents, which
were substantial, were prepared by Salt Lake City Corporation, such should be construed strictly against said party.
Their own documents specifically state that James Constructors, Inc. is the sole contractor, and that no alteration or
modification may be had except that is in writing and signed
by all parties thereto.

Had Salt Lake City Corporation desi-

red to receive the guarantee or additional assurance from the
Hood Corporation, it would have been very easy to request
under the signature of such, and in fact it was absolutely
required under the terms of the contract if it is to alter
the said contract, or become a part of such contract.
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POINT III
CONTRACT LAW PROHIBITS THE IMPOSITION OF LIABILITY WHERE NO
PRIVITY EXISTS BETWEEN SAID PARTIES
Pursuant to the general provisions of contract law and
the concept of privity, the American Juris Prudence volume on
contracts states as follows:
"As a general thing, the obligation of contracts is
limited to the parties making them, and, ordinarily,
only those who are parties to contracts are liable for
their breach. Parties to a contract cannot thereby
impose any liability on one who, under its terms, is a
stranger to the contract, and in any event, in order to
bind a third person contractually, and expression of
assent by such person is necessary. This is particularly so where the contract is one for services. In the
case of a written contract, the person who is not named
in, or bound by, the terms of a written contract cannot
be rendered liable on it by a mere intention that he
should be bound . . ." 17 Am.Jur. 2nd, Contracts, §294.
It is undisputed that the third party defendant, Hood
Corporation, is a valid California corporation, and the
plaintiff and third party defendant, James Constructors,
Inc., is a valid Nevada corporation.

Further, that the

defendant and third party plaintiff, Salt Lake City Corporation, is a valid Utah corporation.

Each of these parties are

separate and distinct entities, free to contract among themselves.

There have been no allegations in any of the plead-

ings herewith, or in the Answers to Interrogatories submitted
by Salt Lake City Corporation, regarding any contractual
relationship between the Salt Lake City Corporation and the
third party defendant, Hood Corporation.

Based upon the

principles of contract law, such entities being separate and
distinct among themselves, should preclude any liability on
the part of the Hood Corporation and be additional basis for
Summary Judgment as prayed by such third party defendant.
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POINT IV
PRINCIPLES OP CORPORATE LAW DICTATE INDEPENDENT LIABILITY
AMONG PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATION
It is without dispute, that a parent and a subsidiary
corporation, can be two separate and distinct entities.

In

fact, by definition if such corporations are valid, two distinct entities exist.

In Fletchers Cyclopedia Corporations,

§43, this general rule of law is stated as follows;
"Ownership of all the stock of a corporation coupled
with common management and direction does not, however,
operate as a merger of two corporations into one single
entity. Under ordinary circumstances a parent corporation will not be liable for the obligations of its
subsidiary."
"A contract in terms and in name of one corporation
cannot be treated as that of both, if they are in law
separate entities, and so dealt with; . . ."
The above principles from Fletchers are well established
rules of law throughout the country.

The principle that a

parent corporation, and its subsidiary are viewed as independent corporations, and not liable for the obligations of each
other is a well recognized point of law.

See:

Cole vs. City

of Las Cruces, 567 P.2nd, 629 (N.M. 1983); Anderson vs.
Section 11, Inc., 626 P.2nd, 1027, (WA App. 1981); Service
Iron Foundry, Inc. vs. M.A. Bell, Company, 588 P.2nd, 463
(Kan. App. 1978); Schlecht vs. Equitable Builders, Inc., 535
P.2nd, 86 (OR 1975); Pearlman vs. Great States Life Insurance
Company, 436 P.2nd, 164 (Colo. 1968).
Under the facts of the instant case, even though James
Constructors, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidy of the Hood
Corporation, each are separate and distinct from each other.
There have been no allegations to the contrary.
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ARGUMENT AND SUMMARY
It is asserted by the third party defendant Hood Corporationf that no genuine issues as to any material facts
exists, and a Summary Judgment should be granted in their
favor, dismissing any claims of the third party plaintiff,
Salt Lake City Corporation, against such party.

The Salt

Lake City Corporation asserts liability on the part of third
party defendant Hood Corporation based upon their receipt of
a copy of Hood's consolidated financial statement, and as
they further allege, they would not have awarded the contract
to James Constructors, Inc. unless it was upon the reliance
on the strength and financial ability of the Hood Corporation.

It is respectfully submitted to the Court that such

bare contentions of the Salt Lake City Corporation are unsupported by any facts in law or equity and raise no material
question of fact as will preclude the entry of Summary Judgment in this matter.
The Utah Supreme Court has been very explicit in following such rational.

In the case of Massey vs. Utah Power &

Light Co., 609 P.2nd, 937, (Utah 1980), Justice Hall in affirming a lower Court Summary Judgment decision, which dismissed the claim of a plaintiff alleging negligence on the part
of the defendant, Utah Power & Light, when they stated:

"A

Motion for Summary Judgment is an effective means of
ascertaining the existence of undisputed facts to help
support a judgment as a matter of law and thus avoid the
necessity of trial. Of courtse, Summary Judgment is
appropriate only if the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and other submission of the parties reflect that
there is no genuine issue of a material fact. However,
bare conentions, unsupported by any specification of
facts in support thereof, raise no material questions of
fact as will preclude the entry of a Summary Judgment."
-9-

In the Massey case, the Court in viewing the totality of
the circumstances of the allegations and responses of the
parties, ruled as a matter of law that the defendant was not
negligent in the maintenance of the power lines which electrocuted the said plaintiff.

In the case at hand, a similar

analogy should be reached on the part of the defendant Hood
Corporation.

They are a separate and distinct entity, with

the only connection in this case being the fact that they are
the sole owner of the stock of James Constructors, Inc.

If

that fact alone creates liability on their part, justice
would not be served and it would be contrary to the status of
the law.
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted by the third
party defendant, Hood Corporation, that third party plaintiff, Salt Lake City Corporation's Complaint be dismissed as
to them, pursuant to the prayer of their Answer.
DATED this

day of June, 1985.

DAVID 7A. REEVE
Attorney for Third Party
Defendant Hood Corporation

-10-

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Third Party Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment against Third Party Plaintiff, postage pre-paid,
this

day of June, 1985 to the following:
Arthur L. Keesler, Jr.
Attorney for Salt Lake City Corporation
100 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
C. Reed Brown
Attorney for James Constructors, Inc.
and Industrial Indemnity Company
4685 South Highland Drive, Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
/

DAVID A. REEVE #2717
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST
Attorney for Third Party
Defendant Hood Corporation
1300 Walker Center
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-2093
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC.,
a Nevada corporation,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF MARC LAULHERE

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
Defendant.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation of
the State of Utah,
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC.,
a Nevada corporation, HOOD
CORPORATION, California
corporation, and INDUSTRIAL
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a
California corporation,

Civil No.

C 84-2857

Judge Judith Billings

Third Party Defendants.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

ss.

I, Marc Laulhere, after being duly sworn upon oath,
depose and state as follows:

1.

That I am the president of the Hood Corporation, the

third party defendant in the above entitled action, and have
been throughout the period of time in question in the pending
suit.
2.

That James Constructors, Inc., a Nevada corporation,

is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Hood Corporation.

Fur-

ther, such entity is a valid independent corporation, and
operates independently from the Hood Corporation.
3.

Regarding the contract between the third party

plaintiff, Salt Lake City Corporation, and James Constructors, Inc., which was entered into in the summer of 1983,
Hood Corporation was never contacted in any way by Salt Lake
City Corporation regarding the execution of said contract.
4.

That the Hood Corporation and its subsidiaries, have

an annual audited consolidated financial statement prepared.
Within this audited consolidated statement, each of the Hood
Corporation's subsidiaries are listed independently, specifically outlining all of their assets and liabilities and
financial data, distinct and seperate of their parent, the
Hood Corporation.; Such audited statement is distributed by
the Hood Corporation to each of its subsidiaries and other
interested parties.
5.

That the Hood Corporation never furnished any finan-

cial data to the Salt Lake City Corporation in connection
with the James Constructors, Inc.'s bid and contract with

said city, nor were they ever asked to furnish, either orally
or in writing, any documentation or materials concerning
their subsidiary James Constructors, Inc., or Hood Corporation's relationship with such.
DATED this

day of June, 1985.

MARC LAUL'HERE
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
1985.
Notary Public
My commission expires:

Residing at:

day of June,

ARTHUR L. KEESLER, J R . #17 81
A t t o r n e y for Third P a r t y P l a i n t i f f
S a l t Lake C i t y C o r p o r a t i o n
100 C i t y & C o u n t y B u i l d i n g
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 1
Telephone:
(801) 535-7788
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT IAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, I N C . ,
a Nevada c o r p o r a t i o n ,

)
)

Plaintiff,

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

vs.

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation of
the State of Utah,
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, I N C . ,
a N e v a d a c o r p o r a t i o n , HOOD
CORPORATION, C a l i f o r n i a
c o r p o r a t i o n and INDUSTRIAL
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a
California corporation,
Third Party

Defendants.

REPLY AFFIDAVIT
C i v i l N o . C 8 4 - 2 857
Judge J u d i t h

Billings

STATE OF UTAH

)
: SS,

County of Salt Lake)
Arthur L. Keeslerf Jr. being duly sworn deposes and states
as follows:
I am the attorney for Salt Lake City Corporation, the
defendant and third party plaintiff in the above consolidated
action.

Third party defendant Hood Corporation has made a Motion

for Summary Judgment based upon the fact that the third party
defendant is a separate and legal entity and not responsible for
the debts of their subsidiary corporation James Constructors,
Inc.
It is the theory of Salt Lake City Corporation in its
Complaint that James Constructors, Inc. is nothing, but tha alter
^ego of Hood Corporation and as such is not a separate entity and
THat Hood Corporation is responsible for the breach of contract
by James Constructors, Inc.

It is a well known theory of law

that to defeat a Motion for Summary Judgment there needs only to
be a question of fact for the jury.

Salt Lake City Corporation

respectfully submits that there are many questions of fact for
the jury and that the question of Hood Corporation's liability
cannot be determined on a Motion for Summary Judgment.

The

leading case which sets down the criteria as to whether a parent
corporation can be liable for a subsidiary on the basis of the
theory of alter ego is Cruttenden v. Mantura, 640 P.2d 932.

This

case cites ten separate criteria that should be looked at by the
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Court in determining whether a s u b s i d i a r y i s an a l t e r ego of a
parent c o r p o r a t i o n .

I t f u r t h e r goes on to say t h a t not a l l of

t h e s e g u i d e l i n e s must be met f but these are only f a c t o r s for the
t r i a l court to consider in determining whether or not to
recognize a corporation as a s e p a r a t e e n t i t y .

Examining these

ten c r i t e r i a i t would seem t h a t t h e r e are a t l e a s t six of the ten
which would i n d i c a t e t h a t James Constructors was nothing, but the
a l t e r ego of Hood Corporation*

The f i r s t c r i t e r i a would be "(1)

the p a r e n t corporation owns a l l or a majority of the c a p i t a l
stock of the s u b s i d i a r y . "

In r e f e r r i n g to the d e p o s i t i o n of Mark

Laulhere the P r e s i d e n t of Hood Croporation taken on December 18,
1984 at page 7 Mr. Laulhere was asked the following q u e s t i o n :
"And was t h i s an out and out cash purchase? Did
you purchase a l l of i t , 100% of the stock in W.C.
James?
"Answer:

Yes."

As can be seen from Mr. Laulhere 1 s answer the f i r s t c r i t e r i a
c l e a r l y met in t h a t Hood Corporation owns a l l of the stock of
James C o n s t r u c t o r s , I n c .
C r i t e r i a No.(3)the parent corporation finances the
subsidiary.

Page 17 of Mr. Laulhere 1 s deposition::

"Question: Has Hood Corporation loaned any money
to James Constructors?
"Answer: We have advanced funds but we h a v e n ' t
made s p e c i f i c l o a n s .
"Question: Do you have any idea approximately how
much has been advanced to James?
"Answer:

No I d o n ' t .
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is

" Q u e s t i o n : Do you know t h e terms of t h e repayment
by James t o Hood?
"Answer: We h a v e n ' t e s t a b l i s h e d any terms of
repayment."
Page 18
"Question: Are you the guarantors of any loans
that have been made to James?
"Answer: Yes.
"Question: Can you give me the approximate amount
of these loans?
"Answer: My recollection is that we have just
guaranteed one loan at First Security Bank in
Utah.
"Question:

Do you know the amount of that loan?

"Answer: Originally it was for $300,000.
sure of the exact amount.
"Question:

I'm not

And do you know what the loan was for?

"Answer: I think it was to pay off some other
loans and provide working capital."
Criteria No. (5)
capital.

The subsidiary has grossly inadequate

As can be seen from the attached Exhibit "A" the

consolidated statement of operations and return any earnings for
Hood Corporation and its subsidiaries James Constructors showed a
net loss for the year 1983 of $36f000.
Criteria No. (8)

In the papers of the parent corporation,

and in the statements of its officers the "subsidiary" is
referred to as such or as a department of the division.
As can be clearly seen from the consolidated financial
statement of Hood James Contructors is included in the
-4-

consolidated financial statement and is included as a subsidiary
of Hood Corporation.
Criteria No. (9)

The directors or executives of the

subsidiary do not act independently in the interest of the
subsidiary but take direction from the parent corporation
referring once again to the deposition of Mark Laulhere the
president of Hood Corporation page 3 6 line 18 through 25.
"Question: And did you approve both of these
bonds or these requests for bonding?
"Answer:

Yes.

"Question: And do you r e c e i v e p e r i o d i c r e p o r t s on
those p a r t i c u l a r jobs as you did on the S a l t Lake
City j o b . ?
"Answer:

Yes.

"Question: How often do you receive reports on
those jobs?
"Answer:

A monthly basis.

"Question: Do you review James Constructors
financial structure on a monthly basis also?
"Answer:

Yes.

"Question:
"Answer:

Who does that review?
I do with our chief financial officer."

As clearly can be seen James Constructors finances along with
their jobs are closely monitored and directed by the officers of
Hood Corporation, the parent corporation.
Criteria No. (10)

The formal legal requirements of the

subsidiary as a separate and independent corporation are not
observed.

Once again referring to Mr. Laulhere's deposition
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pages 38 and 39:
"Question:
"Answer:

Who performs the audit of James books?

Ernest and Whitney.

"Question:
"Answer:

The same a u d i t o r s t h a t do y o u r s ?
Yes.

"Question:
"Answer:

And t h a t ' s

a consolidated

audit?

Yes.

As c l e a r l y c a n b e s e e n J a m e s a u d i t i s d o n e by t h e
corporation's
consolidated

a u d i t o r s a s p a r t of t h e p a r e n t
a u d i t and i t

parent

corporation's

i s n o t an i n d e p e n d e n t and

separate

audit.
It

is respectfully

submitted

t h a t James C o n s t r u c t o r s

was p u r c h a s e d by Hood C o r p o r a t i o n

s o l e l y to have a non-union

company t o d o b u s i n e s s i n t h e S t a t e of Utah and i s
c o n t r o l l e d by Hood C o r p o r a t i o n .

As s u c h i t

for the jury to determine at the t r i a l
n o t Hood C o r p o r a t i o n

is responsible

c o n t r a c t of J a m e s C o n s t r u c t o r s
d e c i d e d s i m p l y on t h e a f f i d a v i t
contradicted

30

totally

i s a q u e s t i o n of

of t h i s a c t i o n w h e t h e r

of Mr. L a u l h e r e which i s
in the

deposition.

d a y of J u l y 198 5 .

ARTHUR L. KEEStfER, JXj/
Assistant City Attorney
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fact
or

f o r t h e d e b t s and b r e a c h o f

and t h a t t h i s m o t i o n c a n n o t

by h i s s w o r n t e s t i m o n y

DATED t h i s

Inc.

be

totally

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this . ^ f ^ day of July,
1985.

NOTARY PUBLIC, residing in
Salt Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Reply
Affidavit to David A. Reeve, ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST, 1300
Walker Center, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 and to C. Reed Brown,
4685 South Highland Drive, Suite 202, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117,
by depositing the same in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid,
this ;=V<^K day of July, 1985.

ccll7

-7-

ci&jiuxn^

SCKEDUi£ 4

ST\TI>L?.T CF c-^Tias AKD rsnua) EAFNTOS (irTicrr)

PXD 0V*>O=*Tin* A»D SoP-Sm T J ' S
JASMAJW 3 1 , 19^3

HoJ
Consolidated

Eliminations

Oorrvntion

J . A.
TUi^^cn

Tivro
Services,

&S>n, I n c .

WjteuxI--T.~»C,
l*d»

Inc.

n/uxs H Or»trotors
F O R ,
F^iiprjit
KoJco
HoJ
__Inc.
^ y ? l y Co. F a r n s , I n c . Cm*-truction

PiL-J-e
J.-es
K-rcury
M&H
Trucl i\ig C o r w t r u - t o - s , Constru t o r s , C o m x i i c a t i o n s ,
Co., Inc.
Inc.
Inc.
Inc.

^C%CTVH»S:

0 » sf~u~tion inroi*
*vilf;s and o t h e r o p - r P t i r ^ inrtT-c
E q u i t y in i n c o r e fron p a r t n e r «,V ipe
and j o i n t v e n t u r e s
Ir>-cr>» frcm F-arJi Arabian or»"*rations
OtS^r, net

Costs a r l expenses:
Ccretrvsctien costs
C e n t o f s p i e s t-A o p r a t i t x * r*-r»*-\ses
O n c r a l »-d a r r z i n i s t r a t i v e o p v x s e s
I n t e r e s t expense
Lryts i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h d i s p o s i t i o n
o f T e v « Tsrv^ue, I n c .

I X O E (U35S) FOTRE 15-T D*TD>£
CF SUBSIDIARIES AM) DCOE TAXES

$63,r/.'i,030
2,177,no

$'•7/57,000
$

KET mnE (icss)

$1,593,030

$13,814,030

8.000
1,631 ,ttJ0

^ 2 ° °
J 3,6--0 ,CO0

n,4S8,000

13,000
11,030

1,936/00
7,000
144,000
2,030

8.0JO

37,0 0

2,0=9,030

33,600,000

$2,670,000
3,GC9,OX3
1,293,000
1,873,000
72.I01.CCJO

2,567,000
3/60,030

2,116,030
1,831,0 0
(£57,030)

55,826,000
2,618,030
7,542,000
711,030
1,053,000
67.7S0.CO0

3/K?,qjQ

3,6c9,CO0
1,233,000
l,716,Cno
54,3-3,000

1,873,000
2,478,030

??,255,0^0 $ 4S/Q3
~2,>55,030
4S/-J0

371,030
3,041,030

$

15.000
15,000

$

1,Q~Q
1, CJ0

43,535,000
4,772,000
445,030
1/53,000
49,V)3/uO

4,555,0311

4,351,000

Ket ( l o s s ) o f s u b s i d i a r y
P r o v i s i o n f o r federal and s t a t e
inccae taxes

493,030

(418;fO0)

(418,000)

(418,00)

1,659,030
2,478,000

$

5,000

5/»0

(5,000)

(5,000)

$

13,000

8.000

1.P32.030
25,030

6,000
22,000

2,596,OX)
531,030
246,000

1,857,000

28,000

3,373,l'JO

39S.030

20,000

(332,030)

15,000

(8,030)

(36,000)

(4S?,030)

240,000

20,000

(332,OJO)

15,000

(8,030)

(36.0JO)

(458,030)

81,000
159,000

19,000

(883,000)

$

8,000

1,135,000
7,030

8,0 0

(8,030)

(8,030)

133,000
265,000

R e t a i n e d e a r n i n g s ( d e f i c i t ) as o f
J a n u a r y 3 1 , 1982

9^0,000

8,837,000

8,837,000

1,051,000

(169,000)
469,000

Charge i n connection v i t h a c q u i s i t i o n
o f 4 , 8 7 5 s h a r e s of ccranon s t o c k

KETAB3D EASSDCS (DEFICIT)
AS OF JAWAKY.31, 1983

(775,000)

$90,000

195,000

$(760,000)

$?3,000

$183,000

(342,000)

(342,000)
8,495,000

$10,973,000

(222,000) 1,169.000

8,495,000

$

522.000

$10.973,000

$1,046,000

$(177.000)
$

734,000 $(202,000)$

837,033

-19-20-

$(36,030)

$ (^69,030)

$ (729,000)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four

(4) true and correct copies of

the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT were hand delivered this 19th
day of October, 1987, to each of the following:
C. Reed Brown, Esq.
HINTZE & BROWN
Attorneys for James Constructors
3450 Highland Drive, Suite 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Jay Jensen, Esq.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneys for James Constructors
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Wilford A. Beesley, Esq.
Stanford P. Fitts, Esq.
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant Salt Lake City
Corporation
310 Deseret Book Building
40 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

$/f&.*
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SUPREME. COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKF CITY, UTAH
September 4, 1987
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

David A Reeue, Esq.
ARMSTRONG, RAW11NCS & WIST
1300 Walker Center
Salt lake CJ ty, UT
84111

James Constructors, [nc., a
Nevada corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v,
Salt Lake City Corporation,
Defendant ana Appellant,

No. 870103

Salt Lake* City Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
u .
James Constructors, Inc., a
Nevada corporation, Hood
corporation, and Industrial
Indemnity Company, a California
corporat i on,
Defendants and Respondents.

Pursuant to the the authority vested in this Court,
this case is poured-over to the Court of Appeals for
disposition. All further pleadings a.nd correspondence
should be directed to that Court. Their address is 230
South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102.

Geoffrey J

Butler, Clerk

